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Appellate Practice and Procedure

by K. Todd Butler*
This Article reviews federal appellate procedure decisions in the
Eleventh Circuit during the 2006 calendar year. Questions considered
this year include the role of the notice of appeal in federal appellate
jurisdiction, which is addressed in the first section below. The second
section addresses the necessity of a final order for appeal, with emphasis
on conditional final orders and when they are subject to appeal. The
third section addresses the necessity of raising issues before the district
court in order to preserve them for appeal.
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION: THE NOTICE OF APPEAL

The decision in United States v. Machado1 left Gregorio Machado in
a conundrum that would have made Joseph Heller proud. Indicted on
thirteen counts of conspiracy to launder drug money in March 1997,
Machado entered a plea of guilty to Count I in May 1997.2 The written
plea agreement provided that eleven counts would be dropped and that
Machado would "'fully and unreservedly cooperate and assist the United
States in the forfeiture and recovery of the forfeited assets, portions
thereof, or their substitutes wherever located."' 3 According to Machado,
the value of the items subject to forfeiture was approximately $12
million.4
The district court sentenced Machado to fifty-one months imprisonment on July 28, 1997 and entered judgment on July 30, 1997. The
judgment stated which counts of money laundering had been dropped,

* Principal in the firm of K. Todd Butler, P.C., Cairo, Georgia. Florida State University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 1994); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D.,
cum laude, 1999). Member, Mercer Law Review (1997-1999). Member, State Bars of
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
1. 465 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 1303.
3. Id.

4. Id.
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stated that Machado had pleaded guilty to Count I, stated his sentence
on Count I, and stated that a separate forfeiture order would be entered.
The judgment entered on July 30 did not include an order identifying
the property to be forfeited.5
Approximately seven months later, on March 11, 1998, the government
filed a motion for the forfeiture order, pursuant to which the district
court entered a preliminary order on March 12, 1998. The district court
entered a subsequent order for forfeiture of additional property on April
24, 1998 and the final forfeiture order on July 14, 1998.6
Machado appealed none of the forfeiture orders, but on September 4,
1998, he filed a pro se motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 41(e) 7 for the return of documents that he believed would
show that some of his property had been improperly forfeited. On
January 20, 1999, the district court ordered the documents returned, but
the government could not fully comply because some of the documents
had been destroyed.'
On August 22, 2002, the Eleventh Circuit entered an order in United
States v. Petrie,9 in which the court discussed the detailed procedure for
forfeiture provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2.10
Included in this detailed rule is a requirement that the forfeiture order
be entered at the time of sentencing. 1
On April 23, 2003, Machado filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)' 2 requesting that the final order of forfeiture
be vacated; again, the district court denied and the Eleventh Circuit
upheld.13 Again on May 17, 2004, Machado filed a motion pursuant to
Rule 60(b), which the district court denied and the Eleventh Circuit
upheld, holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) cannot be
used to challenge civil forfeiture orders. 14 Finally, on December 17,
2004, Machado filed a second motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g) 5 and the All Writs Act,' 6 demanding return

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1303-04.
Id. at 1304.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
Machado, 465 F.3d at 1304.
302 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1284-85; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2.
Petrie, 302 F.3d at 1284 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Machado, 465 F.3d at 1304.
Id.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g).
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000).
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of the forfeited property. 7 The district court denied the last motion on
February 7, 2005.8
As the Eleventh Circuit stated, the heart of Machado's argument was
that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter the forfeiture
order on July 14, 1998 because the court lost jurisdiction to do so when
it entered the order sentencing Machado on July 28, 1997 (or July 30,
1997, when the order was actually entered).19 Machado appealed to the
axiom of United States federal court jurisprudence emphasizing that
federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction and are
required to sit in review of their own subject matter jurisdiction at all
times.2 ° Federal subject matter jurisdiction can never be forfeited or
waived, and defects in subject matter jurisdiction must be corrected
regardless of whether the issue was raised in the district court or on
appeal. 2' The issue of federal subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
by a party or by the court on its own initiative and the issue may be
raised "'at any
stage in the litigation, even after trial and the entry of
22
judgment.'
The Eleventh Circuit refused to consider Machado's objection to the
district court's jurisdiction to enter a forfeiture order subsequent to
sentencing.23 The Eleventh Circuit's refusal was based on the fact that
Machado had not filed a timely notice of appeal following the district
court's entry of the forfeiture order.24 A timely notice of appeal is itself
"'mandatory and jurisdictional,'" and when the appellant fails to file a
timely notice of appeal, the appellate
court is "'without jurisdiction to
25
review the decision on the merits.'"
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Machado emphasizes that, on
appeal, jurisdictional issues have a two-layered character. Federal
jurisdiction must be satisfied, however, before an appellate court may
address the subject matter jurisdiction of a district court. The appellate
court must itself have federal appellate jurisdiction.26
Nevertheless, Machado's conundrum is probably not the inescapably
double-binding Catch-22 that Joseph Heller made popular. Because
subject matter jurisdiction is always an issue, Machado could probably

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Machado, 465 F.3d at 1304.
Id.
Id. at 1305.
See id. at 1306.
Id.
Id. (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1240 (2006)).
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1305 (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988)).
Id. at 1306.
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raise the issue today in the district court. If the district court rejected
Machado's objection to its subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order
forfeiting his property, then upon timely notice of appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit would have appellate jurisdiction to review his case.
The issue of appellate jurisdiction was also discussed in Holloman v.
Mail-Well Corp. 7 Holloman is an ERISA case in which the plaintiff,
Otis Holloman, had elected the "Last Survivor Option" on his retirement
plans. This option provided that he would accept a reduced monthly
pension payment, and in return his spouse would continue to receive his
pension payment until her death if she outlived him. After his
retirement, Mr. Holloman was widowed and subsequently remarried.
There was evidence that Mr. Holloman confirmed with his plan
administrator that his new wife would be entitled to the same benefits
to which his late wife would have been entitled."
On July 7, 2000, the defendant acquired Mr. Holloman's prior
employer and decided to accelerate payment of benefits to retirees of the
acquired entity. After application of the actuarial assumptions provided
in the plan, a lump sum payment to Mr. Holloman was determined. The
lump sum, however, included no payment for benefits that the same
actuarial assumptions should have provided for Mr. Holloman's second
wife. Mr. Holloman retained counsel, filed suit, and after a hard-fought
legal battle, lost in the district court on summary judgment.2 9 In the
course of the legal battle, the district court imposed sanctions on Mr.
Holloman's attorney under 28 U.S.C. § 192730 for having filed motions
to compel discovery that
the district court believed were filed in bad
31
faith and lacked merit.
On appeal of the district court's final summary judgment order and
the district court's order denying the plaintiff's motions to compel
discovery,12 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment and the
orders on the motions to compel.13 Furthermore, it dismissed the
appeal of the attorney fees sanctions.34
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal of attorney fees sanctions
because the notice of appeal was defective on that issue.3 5 The court
emphasized the principle that notice of appeal is mandatory and

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

443 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 835.
Id. at 835-36.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
Holloman, 443 F.3d at 844.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 844.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 844.
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jurisdictional, stating that the "rule is absolute and inflexible.""
Nevertheless, the court also noted that it would apply the rules in a
lenient manner and determined that the notice of appeal had been
properly filed where certain minimum elements were met.37

Those

elements are as follows: (1) the notice of appeal must state the name or
names of the persons taking the appeal; (2) the notice of appeal must
identify the judgment or the order being appealed; (3) the notice of
appeal must identify the court to which the appellant is taking the
appeal.38
Where these minimum standards are timely met, the requirement of
a notice of appeal will be satisfied and appellate jurisdiction will
exist.39 Practitioners should note that the court dismissed the appeal

of the attorney fees sanctions because the sanctions had been ordered
against Mr. Holloman's attorney and not against Mr. Holloman as the
plaintiff.4 ° Because the attorney fees sanctions were against the
plaintiff's attorney, the attorney was required to state his own name as
one of the persons taking the appeal. 4'
In KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville ("KH Outdoor IT ),4 the
Eleventh Circuit's leniency was more evident in recognizing the
effectiveness of a notice of appeal with respect to appellate subject
matter jurisdiction. This case actually involved two notices of appeal.43
The plaintiff filed suit against the City of Trussville, Alabama under 42
U.S.C. § 1983" to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance that the
plaintiff alleged unconstitutionally favored commercial speech over
noncommercial speech.45 The district court granted an interlocutory
order enjoining the defendant city from enforcing its ordinance and
granted the plaintiff nominal damages under § 1983; however, the
interlocutory order did not provide for an amount of nominal damages.
Following this order, the defendant city filed its first notice of appeal,
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order.46

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
1261,

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 844-45.
Id.
465 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1259.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
KH Outdoor H, 465 F.3d at 1258.
Id. at 1259; see KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville ("KH Outdoor P), 458 F.3d
1263-64 (11th Cir. 2006).
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Following the injunction, the city moved for summary judgment on the
issue of compensatory damages because the basis of the plaintiff's action
did not result in actual injury to the plaintiff. The district court granted
the city's motion for summary judgment, but in the same order the court
set nominal damages for the plaintiff at $100. The plaintiff did not
appeal the court's order on compensatory damages, but the city filed its
second notice of appeal with respect to the nominal damages.47
The plaintiff argued that in the city's second appeal, the city had not
challenged the plaintiff's entitlement to nominal damages, but rather
had only appealed the amount of nominal damages. The plaintiff further
suggested that the defendant city had failed to preserve its right to
appeal the plaintiff's entitlement to nominal damages because it failed
to address that issue in its appeal from the court's preliminary
injunction.48
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff's argument.49 The
court pointed out that the defendant would have had no right to argue
the issue of nominal damages on appeal of the interlocutory order
because the court's jurisdiction was limited under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)50 to that portion of the district court's order "'granting, continuing,
modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions.' 5 1 The defendant city
have waived its right to appeal those rights that had not yet
could not
2
arisen.1

Leniency in construction of the notice of appeal came into play when
the plaintiff argued that by designating in its second notice of appeal
that portion of the district court's final order setting the amount of
nominal damages, and not the district court's order granting nominal
damages, the defendant did not effectively raise the issue of entitlement
to nominal damages.5 3 The Eleventh Circuit was again unpersuaded
based on its policy of "liberally constru[ing] the notice of appeal in favor
of the appellant 'where the intent to appeal an unmentioned or
mislabeled ruling is apparent and there is no prejudice to the adverse
party."'54 The court held that the defendant had clearly intended to
appeal the plaintiff's entitlement to nominal damages and further
pointed out that the defendant had made no argument at all about the

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

KH OutdoorH, 465 F.3d at 1259.
Id. at 1259-60.
Id. at 1260.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2000).
KH Outdoor 11, 465 F.3d at 1259 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)).
See id.
Id. at 1259-60.
Id. at 1260 (quoting Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704 (11th Cir. 1984)).
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amount of nominal damages in its briefs.5" Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the plaintiff's entitlement to $100 in nominal damages.~6
The contents of a notice of appeal, though subject to lenient construction by the Eleventh Circuit, are of utmost importance; however, the
requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal are equally urgent. This
issue was addressed in Dresdner Bank AG v. M/V OLYMPIA VOYAGER.57 Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A),5" the
"notice of appeal [i]n a civil case ... must be filed with the district clerk
within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered."5 9
The time for filing a notice of appeal may be tolled, however, if either
party files a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5960 or 6061
within ten days of the entry of the final judgment.6 2 If the Rule 59 or
60 motion is timely filed, then the time for filing a notice of appeal is
tolled until thirty days subsequent to final disposition of the Rule 59 or
60 motion. 3
In Dresdner Bank AG the issue was whether an amended Rule 59 or
60 motion that is filed more than ten days after entry of final judgment
will have the effect of waiving the timeliness of the original Rule 59 or
60 motion and thus effectively nullify the tolling effect of the original
timely filing. 4 The Eleventh Circuit held that its decision in Pate v.
Seaboard R.R., Inc.6" provides the controlling law. 6 Accordingly, the
court held that an amended motion under Rule 59 or 60 does not
supersede the original filing because "'there is no reason for foreclosing
amendment of the motion when this would be justified according to the
usual standards for permitting amendments.'"" The court also noted
treating the amended Rule 59 or 60 motion as a new filing subsequent
to the initial ten day filing would have the practical effect of prohibiting
amendments to such motions to the extent that the amendment would
waive the tolling of the period for filing notice of appeals. 6

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id. at 1262.
465 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2006).
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
Id.
FED. R. CIv. P. 59.
FED. R. Cirv. P. 60.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
See id.
465 F.3d at 1271.
819 F.2d 1074 (11th Cir. 1987).
DresdnerBank AG, 465 F.3d at 1271.
Id. (quoting Pate, 819 F.2d at 1085).
See id. at 1271-72.
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In Cano v. Baker,69 the appellees objected to the appellate court's
jurisdiction based on the fact that the appellant had not filed a timely
notice of appeal to the district court's denial of its Rule 60(b) motion.70
It bears mentioning that thirty-two years after filing suit and being
granted the relief that she sought, the appellant filed her Rule 60(b)
motion requesting to be relieved of the judgment entered in her favor.
The plaintiff requested an evidentiary hearing to show that newly
revealed facts and changes in the law since the entry of the judgment in
her favor were a basis for relieving her of the judgment.7
The district court declined to grant the appellant's Rule 60(b) motion.
The appellant then filed a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration of the
court's denial of her Rule 60 motion, which the district court also denied.
Appellant then filed a timely notice of appeal within ten days of the
district court's denial of her Rule 59 motion, seeking review of both the
denial of the Rule 60 motion and the Rule 59 motion."
On appeal, the appellees argued that the appellant had not filed her
notice of appeal within ten days of the court's denial of her Rule 60
motion, and therefore the court of appeals lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. 73 The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that
by filing a Rule 59 motion within ten days of the court's denial of the
Rule 60 motion, the time for filing the notice of appeal of the court's
decision on the Rule 60 motion had been tolled.74
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION:

APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER

In Wagner v. First Horizon Pharmaceutical Corp.7" and Garfield v.
NDC Health Corp., the Eleventh Circuit addressed the finality of
conditional orders. In Wagner the district court anticipated that the
plaintiffs would move to amend their complaint in light of the defen-7
dants' motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).1
Rather than granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district
court entered an order allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
subject to the condition that the plaintiffs first pay the defendants' costs

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

435 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1341.
Id. at 1339, 1340.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
464 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006).
466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1276; FED. R. CIrv. P. 9(b).
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and fees incurred in bringing the Rule 9(b) motion to dismiss. The court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for relief from the condition.7 8
Rather than meet the condition, the plaintiffs allowed the time for
meeting the condition to expire and filed a notice of appeal, arguing that
the original complaint met the pleading requirements and that the
district court should not have conditioned amendment on payment of the
defendants' costs and fees. The defendants argued that the Eleventh
Circuit lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the plaintiffs had
not appealed the initial order setting conditions on the plaintiffs'
amendment of their complaint. 7
The Eleventh Circuit denied the
defendants' objection and heard the appeal because the district court had
entertained the plaintiffs' motion to lift the condition, and the plaintiffs
then filed their notice of appeal within the time allowed after the stated
condition expired. 0
However, in Garfield the Eleventh Circuit stated that it is not
necessary for the appellant to wait for the expiration of any conditional
period.8 ' The defendant in Garfield had filed a motion to dismiss after
the plaintiff filed its second amended complaint. The distict court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with the provision that the
plaintiff could file a third amended complaint if it did so within thirty
days of the dismissal order's date. Rather than file a third amended
complaint, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal.82
The panel raised the issue nostra sponte on whether the district court's
order dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action with leave to appeal
constituted a final order over which the appellate court might take
jurisdiction. 3 In response to the appellate court's inquiry, the parties
agreed that an order is final if "'it dismisses the entire action or ...the
complaint cannot be saved by amendment.'"84 Without question, as in
'Wagner, the order would have become subject to appeal upon expiration
of the time the district court allowed for amendment. But, restating its
holding in Schuurman v. Motor Vessel "Betty K V," 5 the Eleventh
Circuit noted that "'the plaintiff need not wait until the expiration of the
stated time in order to treat the dismissal as final, but may appeal prior
to the expiration of the stated time period.'" 8
Thus, the Eleventh

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Wagner, 464 F.3d at 1276.
Id.
Id.
See Garfield, 466 F.3d at 1260.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Van Poyck v. Singletary, 11 F.3d 146, 148 (11th Cir. 1994)).
798 F.2d 442 (11th Cir. 1986).
Garfield, 466 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Schuurman, 798 F.2d at 445).
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Circuit did have jurisdiction of the appeal in Garfield, but the court
further noted that by filing his appeal in this manner, the plaintiff in
Garfield waived the right to file any further appeal and was bound by
his pleadings in his second amended appeal.8"
In Morillo-Cedron v. District Director for the U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Services,8 the appellees were awarded attorney fees in
their mandamus case against the district director for the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services because the district court determined that
the case was the "'catalyst'" that prompted the district director to act on
their applications for permanent residency.8 9 The appellees submitted
their application for costs, attorney fees, and expenses in the amount of
$9,888, and the government filed a motion for reconsideration. The
district court denied the motion for reconsideration and adopted the
magistrate court's recommendation of an award of $7,706.15 to the
appellees for attorney fees and costs. The government filed a notice of
appeal.9 ° In response to the appellees' argument that the government
had failed to file a timely notice of appeal, the Eleventh Circuit stated
that a district court's award of attorney fees is not a final order subject
to appeal until after the district court has actually determined the
attorney fees. 9'
III.

PRESERVATION OF THE RECORD AND RAISING NEW ISSUES ON
APPEAL

While, as stated above, a notice of appeal will be treated with leniency
regarding its contents, the same is not necessarily true for the parties'
briefs on appeal. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Tanner Advertising
Group, LLC v.Fayette County,92 "'[I]ssues that clearly are not designated in the initial brief ordinarily are considered abandoned.'" 3 In
Billings v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. ,4the Eleventh Circuit reiterated
the appellate rule that requires parties to raise all appellate issues in
their briefs or else have them deemed abandoned.9 5 In Tanner Advertising Group, the court stated that while "'briefs should be read liberally

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1260-61.
452 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256.
Id.
451 F.3d 777 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 785 (quoting Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950, 953 (11th Cir. 1995)).
459 F.3d 1088 (11th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1093.
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to ascertain the issues raised on appeal,"' the issue must be deemed
abandoned when there is no mention of the issue. 6
Even before an issue may be raised in a party's initial brief, it must
be raised before the district court or it will be deemed abandoned. In
Daewoo Motor America, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.,9 a Korean
automobile manufacturer raised the issue for the first time on appeal
that California law, rather than federal law, should govern a distribution
agreement between itself and General Motors.9" Because the issue was
first raised on appeal and not preserved before the district court, the
issue was deemed waived. Likewise, in Miller v. King,99 the Eleventh
Circuit refused to hear a disabled state prisoner argue for the first time
on appeal that he should be allowed to proceed under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.100
The prohibition against raising issues for the first time on appeal
should, of course, be considered in light of the requirement that a federal
court be satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. In
Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs,'0 1 the Eleventh Circuit went further
to point out that not only may issues relevant to subject matter
jurisdiction be considered on appeal, but it may even be permissible for
parties to supplement the record during the appeal." 2 However, as
noted in Part I, supra, consideration of any matters on appeal first
requires appellate subject matter jurisdiction be established through a
sufficient and timely notice of appeal.

96. 451 F.3d at 785-86 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann, 27 F.3d 1539, 1542 (11th
Cir. 1994)).
97. 459 F.3d 1249 (lth Cir. 2006).
98. Id. at 1256-57.
99. 449 F.3d 1149 (11th Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 1150 n.1; 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
101. 463 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).
102. Id. at 1170-71 (citing Young v. Devaney ex rel. Augusta, Ga., 59 F.3d 1160, 1168
(11th Cir. 1995)).

